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Abstract—We consider the problem where a group of n
nodes, connected to the same broadcast channel (e.g., a wireless
network), want to generate a common secret bitstream, in the
presence of an adversary Eve, who tries to obtain information on
the bitstream. We assume that the nodes initially share a (small)
piece of information, but do not have access to any out-of-band
channel. We ask the question: can this problem be solved without
relying on Eve’s computational limitations, i.e., without using any
form of public-key cryptography?
We propose a secret-agreement protocol, where the n nodes
of the group keep exchanging bits until they have all agreed
on a bit sequence that Eve cannot reconstruct with very high
probability. In this task, the nodes are assisted by a small number
of interferers, whose role is to create channel noise in a way
that bounds the amount of information Eve can overhear. Our
protocol has polynomial-time complexity and requires no changes
to the physical or MAC layer of network devices.
First, we formally show that, under standard theoretical
assumptions, our protocol is information-theoretically secure,
achieves optimal secret-generation rate for n = 2 nodes, and
scales well to an arbitrary number of nodes. Second, we adapt
our protocol to a small wireless 14 m2 testbed; we experimentally
show that, if Eve uses a standard wireless physical layer and is
not too close to any of the nodes, 8 nodes can achieve a secret-
generation rate of 38 Kbps. To the best of our knowledge, ours
is the first experimental demonstration of information-theoretic
secret exchange on a wireless network at a rate beyond a few
tens of bits per second.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem where a group of n nodes,
connected to the same broadcast channel (e.g., a wireless
network), want to generate a common secret bitstream, in the
presence of an adversary Eve, who tries to obtain information
on the bitstream. We assume that the n nodes initially share
a (small) piece of information, but do not have access to any
out-of-band channel or public-key infrastructure. Today, this
problem can be solved using public-key cryptography, such
as the Diffie-Hellman [1] or the RSA [2], [31] key-agreement
protocols: the nodes could use the initially shared information
to form public keys, then periodically use a key-agreement
protocol to generate new secrets. These protocols make the
assumption that Eve does not have the computational resources
to perform certain operations, such as large-integer factoriza-
tion. We ask the question: can we solve this problem without
making any assumption about the adversary’s computational
capabilities, i.e., without using public-key (or any classic form
of) cryptography?
Our work is based on the following observation: whereas
one node’s transmission may be overheard by multiple nodes,
if there is noise in the broadcast channel, it becomes unlikely
that any two nodes overhear exactly the same bits. To illustrate,
consider a person speaking in a low voice in a crowded room—
people standing nearby will hear parts of the speech, but if the
room is sufficiently noisy, it is unlikely that any two of these
people (standing at different locations) will hear the exact same
parts of what the speaker says. We build upon this observation
and use channel noise to prevent eavesdroppers from hearing
exactly the same bits as honest participants. We propose a
new secret-agreement protocol, where the n honest nodes keep
exchanging bits until they have all agreed on a bit sequence
that Eve, with very high probability, cannot reconstruct. In this
task, the n nodes are assisted by interferers that create the right
kind and level of noise to bound the amount of information
that Eve overhears.
Unlike existing cryptographic solutions to this problem,
which rely on the fact that the adversary cannot compute some
function, our protocol relies on the fact that the adversary can-
not overhear all the information received by an honest node.
In other words, we shift the challenge from computation to
network presence: for cryptographic approaches, a dangerous
adversary is one with high computational power (e.g., one with
access to quantum computers); for our approach, a dangerous
adversary is one who is physically present in many locations
in the network at the same time.
We do not imply that there is any pressing need to re-
place the existing crypto-systems that rely on the adversary’s
computational limitations. However, we believe that exploring
alternative approaches (which rely on different kinds of ad-
versary limitations) will become of increasing interest in the
near future, as governments and corporations acquire massive
amounts of computational capabilities, and as new technolo-
gies, such as quantum computing, mature. This interest is
already present in the industry community, where several com-
panies are developing quantum key distribution (QKD) sys-
tems [3]; these enable a pair of nodes to exchange a bitstream
that is information-theoretically secure, i.e., an adversary that
observes the exchange obtains 0 information on the bitstream,
independently from her computational capabilities. A typical
commercial application envisioned for QKD systems is the
periodic generation of one-time pads at a high enough rate to
enable information-theoretically secure transmission of real-
time video, e.g., for military operations [4]. On the other hand,
QKD systems are expensive due to the need for sophisticated
equipment, such as photon detectors. This motivated us to
start exploring the feasibility of secrecy that does not rely on
computational limitations, but also does not require expensive
equipment.
In this paper, we make one theoretical and one practical
contribution:
(1) On the theory side, we design a protocol that enables
n ≥ 2 nodes, which are connected to the same broadcast chan-
nel and initially share a small common secret σ, to establish
a common secret bitstream. Assuming a typical information-
theory model (independent erasure channels between the nodes
and known erasure probabilities), we formally show that: (i)
our protocol is information-theoretically secure; (ii) it achieves
a secret-generation rate that is optimal for n = 2 nodes and
scales well to an arbitrary number of nodes n. (iii) it requires
per-node operations that are of polynomial complexity. To
the best of our knowledge, we advance the state of the art
in information-theoretic security by (i) allowing groups to
have an arbitrary number of nodes n, and (ii) providing a
polynomial-time protocol that is implementable even in the
simplest wireless devices without any changes to their MAC
or physical layers.
(2) On the practical side, we adapt our protocol to a small
wireless testbed that covers an area of 14 m2 and consists
of 8 trusted nodes, 6 interferers (each with two directional
antennae), and an adversary. We experimentally show that, in
our testbed, if the adversary uses a standard wireless physical
layer1 and is located within no less than 1.75 m from any
trusted node, the n = 8 trusted nodes achieve a common
secret generation rate of 38 secret kilobits per second. This
is in contrast to the state of the art in deploying information-
theoretical security on wireless networks, which achieves (only
pair-wise) secret-generation rates on the order of a few tens
of bits per second. To the best of our knowledge, ours is
the first experimental demonstration of information-theoretic
secret exchange on a wireless network at rates of kilobits per
second.
We think that this is an important first step toward bridging
the gap between theoretical and practical work in this area: on
the one hand, we confirm that the criticism typically addressed
at theoretical work on information-theoretic security (indepen-
dent erasure channels and predictable erasure probabilities are
not realistic network conditions) is valid; on the other hand,
we demonstrate that it is feasible to emulate these conditions
in a real wireless network, enough to generate an information-
theoretically secure bitstream of tens of kilobits per second.
That said, we still need to complete several steps before our
protocol is ready for non-experimental deployment: we need
to harden it against collusion and wireless denial-of-service
attacks; and we need to find a more practical and energy-
efficient way of creating interference than using dedicated,
trusted interfering nodes (discussion in Section VIII).
In the rest of the paper, we summarize the main idea
behind our work (§II), we describe our basic secret-agreement
protocol, which is information-theoretically secure against a
passive adversary (§III), state its properties (§IV), and describe
how to secure the protocol against active adversaries (§V).
Next we describe how we adapted our protocol to a small
wireless testbed (§VI) and present our experimental results
(§VII). Finally, we discuss limitations and challenges (§VIII)
and related work (§IX), and we conclude (§X).
1We argue that our protocol will work well even if the adversary possesses
a custom physical layer, but we have not showed this experimentally.
II. SETUP
A. Problem Statement
We consider a set of n ≥ 2 trusted nodes, T0, . . . , Tn−1,
which share an initial common secret σ and are connected to
the same broadcast channel; we will refer to these nodes as
terminals; sometimes we will refer to terminals T0, T1, and
T2 respectively as Alice, Bob, and Calvin. We also assume
that we have available m trusted interferers, i.e., nodes that
can generate noise.
We consider an adversary, Eve, who is connected to the
same broadcast channel as the terminals, but has 0 information
on σ. When we say that Eve acts as a “passive” adversary,
we mean that she does not perform any transmissions, i.e.,
she only tries to eavesdrop on the terminals’ communications;
when we say that Eve acts as an “active” adversary, we mean
that she may perform transmissions, e.g., try to impersonate
a terminal. As a first step, in this paper, we assume that Eve
only has access to a standard physical layer, i.e., no custom
hardware. Also we assume that there is no collusion, i.e.,
there may be multiple adversaries like Eve, and each of them
may move around the network, but they may not exchange
information. In Section VIII (where we discuss the limitations
of our proposal), we describe how we believe that these issues
can be addressed.
Our goal is to design a protocol that enables the n terminals
to establish a new common secret S of size |S| ≫ |σ|, such
that Eve (whether acting as a passive or active adversary)
obtains 0 information on S. By periodically running this
protocol, the terminals will be able to establish a common
secret bitstream.
The terminals communicate with each other in two ways: (1)
When we say that terminal Ti transmits a packet, we mean that
it broadcasts the packet once. (2) When we say that terminal
Ti reliably broadcasts a packet, we mean that it ensures that all
other terminals Ti receive it, e.g., through acknowledgments
and retransmissions; to be conservative, we assume that Eve
receives all reliably broadcast packets.2
We assume a packet-erasure channel between each pair of
nodes: when Ti transmits a packet, Tj (or Eve) receives the
entire packet correctly with probability 1 − δ, or does not
receive it at all; δ is the erasure probability of the channel
between Ti and Tj (or Eve).
We summarize the most commonly used symbols in Table I.
B. Main Idea
We define the “theoretical” network conditions as follows:
1) The channel between Alice and any other terminal Ti is
independent from the channel between Alice and Eve,
i.e., when Alice transmits a packet, the event that Ti
receives it is independent from the event that Eve does.
2) We know the erasure probability δE of the Alice-Eve
channel.
2Our use of reliable broadcasting is similar to the use of a “public channel”
in information theory, with the difference that we do not assume that this
channel has zero cost, i.e., when we compute protocol efficiency, we do take
into account the transmissions made using this channel.
Suppose, for the moment, that these theoretical conditions
hold and that we have only n = 2 terminals, Alice and Bob.
The erasure probability of the Alice-Bob channel is δ1 = 0.5
and of the Alice-Eve channel δE = 0.4, i.e., Eve has better
connectivity to Alice than Bob.
Alice wants to establish a secret S with Bob. To this
end, Alice transmits 10 packets, x1, x2, . . . , x10. Bob correctly
receives 5 of them, x1, x3, x5, x7, x9. Eve correctly receives
6 of the transmitted packets, x1, x3, x5, x6, x8, x10. At this
point, there exist 2 packets, x7, x9, whose contents are known
to both Alice and Bob, but not to Eve. Alice does not know
which are these packets, but she can guess how many they
are: First, she learns which packets Bob received (which is
easily accomplished by having Bob send a feedback message
to Alice, specifying the identities of the packets he received).
Combining this piece of information with the erasure prob-
ability between Alice and Eve, δE , Alice can compute the
expected number of packets received by Bob but not Eve;
in our example, δE = 0.4, hence, of the 5 packets that Bob
received, Eve is expected to not have received 0.4 · 5 = 2
packets.
Alice and Bob establish a secret by performing privacy am-
plification: Alice creates 2 linear combinations of the packets
that Bob received, s1 = x1⊕x5⊕x9 and s2 = x3⊕x7 (where
⊕ denotes the bit-wise XOR operation over the payloads of
the corresponding packets), and creates the secret as their
concatenation, S = 〈s1, s2〉. Then, Alice reliably broadcasts
to Bob which packets to combine to also create the secret.
Even though Eve receives the reliable broadcast and learns
the identities of the packets that were combined to create the
secret, she cannot compute either s1 or s2, because she does
not know the contents of x7 and x9.
C. Challenges
To turn the above idea into a secret-agreement protocol, we
answer the following questions:
(1) Choosing the right linear combinations. In the above
example, Alice chose 2 particular linear combinations, whose
values Eve could not compute, i.e., Alice performed privacy
amplification using very simple linear operations. But is it
always possible for Alice to choose linear combinations of
the packets received by Bob, such that Eve cannot compute
their values (without knowing which packets Eve received)?
(2) Extending to multiple nodes. Suppose that we have
not two, but three terminals, Alice, Bob, and Calvin, that need
to establish a common secret S. Of course, once we have a
scheme that works for two terminals, Alice could use it to
establish a secret, SB , with Bob, a separate secret, SC , with
Calvin, then secretly communicate to each of Bob and Calvin
a common secret S. However, intuitively, we should be able
to do better—surely, Bob and Calvin must have received a
common subset of Alice’s packets. How can we leverage this
common subset to build a better protocol, and how do we
generalize it to an arbitrary number of terminals n?
We address questions (1) and (2) in Section III, where
we present a secret-agreement protocol between n nodes,
which assumes theoretical network conditions and passive
adversaries.
(3) Deterring active attacks. In the above example, Eve
only tried to eavesdrop on Alice’s and Bob’s communications.
In reality, she could also try to impersonate them, e.g., pretend
to be Alice and initiate the secret exchange with Bob. So, how
do we prevent impersonation by adversaries?
We address question (3) in Section V, where we describe
how to add authentication to our secret agreement to protect
it against active adversaries.
(4) Emulating the theoretical network conditions. In the
above example, Alice and Bob were able to establish a secret,
because the Alice-Bob channel was independent from the
Alice-Eve one, which ensured that Bob received some packets
that Eve did not receive. In reality, we cannot assume this: if
Eve positions herself close to Bob, it is quite likely that she
will receive all the packets that he receives. The next question
then is, can we artificially condition a real wireless network,
so as to ensure that Bob (or any trusted node) receives some
minimum number of packets that Eve does not receive?
(5) Estimating what the adversary received. In the above
example, Alice created a secret by concatenating 2 linear com-
binations, exactly as many as the number of packets received
by Bob but not Eve. This is the longest secret that Alice and
Bob could establish without revealing any information about
the secret to Eve: suppose they attempted to generate a longer
secret, by creating and concatenating 3 linear combinations
of the packets received by Bob, e.g., S = 〈s1, s2, s3〉, where
s1 = x1⊕x5⊕x9, s2 = x3⊕x7, and s3 = x3⊕x5⊕x7⊕x9;
but then, Eve would learn something about the secret—that
s1 ⊕ s2 ⊕ s3 = x1, which would increase her chances of
guessing the secret. The gist is that, since there are only 2
packets received by Bob but not Eve, there exist exactly 2
linear combinations of the packets received by Bob that do not
reveal any information to Eve. Hence, it is important for Alice
to correctly guess how many packets were received by Bob
but not Eve: if she overestimates this number, she will create
a longer secret than she should, i.e., reveal some information
about the secret to Eve; if she underestimates this number,
she will create a shorter secret than she could, i.e., achieve a
lower secret-generation rate than the maximum possible. So,
the last question is, how do we estimate how many packets
Eve received in order to create the right secret size?
We address questions (4) and (5) in Section VII, where
we adapt our secret-agreement protocol to a small wireless
testbed.
D. Background
We now summarize the background needed to read the rest
of the paper. Readers who are familiar with linear coding and
information-theoretic secrecy can skip this section.
Consider two packets, x1 and x2, of the same length. When
we say that we linearly combine these packets over the field
F2s , we mean that: (1) We take the contents of packet x1 and
interpret every s consecutive bits as a symbol; as a result, we
get a sequence of symbols, 〈p1, p2, . . .〉. (2) We do the same for
x2, such that we get another sequence of symbols, 〈q1, q2, . . .〉.
(3) We perform some linear operation, denoted by⊕, over each
pair of symbols pi and qi; the resulting sequence, 〈p1⊕q1, p2⊕
q2, . . .〉, is the outcome of the linear combination of the two
packets. For example, if our field is F2, i.e., s = 1, then we
interpret each bit as a symbol; in that case, performing a linear
combination is equivalent to bitwise XOR-ing the contents of
the two packets.
The secrecy of a system S can be expressed as a function
of its entropy, H(S), which is a measure of an eavesdropper’s
uncertainty about the system. By observing the system, the
eavesdropper may learn something about it; this is captured by
the concept of conditional entropy, H(S|O), which expresses
the eavesdropper’s uncertainty about the system S, after she
has completed her observation, O. A system S is information-
theoretically secure, when, by observing S, an eavesdropper
does not decrease her uncertainty about it, i.e., H(S|O) →
H(S).
In our context, the “observer” is Eve, the “system” is
the secret S, and Eve’s “observation” is the set of packets
transmitted by the terminals that Eve receives, XE . In the
worst case, after making her observation, Eve knows the
value of S, in which case H(S|XE) → 0. In the best case,
after making her observation, Eve knows only the length |S|
of the secret, i.e., to her, S is equally likely to have any
value from 0 to 2|S|−1; in this case, H(S|XE) → − log 1|S| ,
which is the maximum uncertainty that Eve can ever have
about S. So, we say that our secret agreement is information-
theoretically secure, when, by receiving the set of packets XE ,
Eve does not decrease her uncertainty about the secret, i.e.,
H(S|XE)→ H(S) = − log 1|S| .
E. Quality Metrics
We use two metrics to characterize the quality of our secret-
agreement protocol:
Reliability. R = H(S|XE)
H(S) , where S is the secret generated
by the protocol, XE is the set of packets transmitted by the
terminals and correctly received by Eve, H(S) is S’s entropy
from Eve’s point of view, and H(S|XE) is S’s conditional
entropy from Eve’s point of view, after Eve has received XE .
Reliability R means that Eve can correctly guess each secret
bit of S with probability 2−R, hence the entire secret S with
probability 2−R|S|. In the example of Section II-B, Eve learns
nothing about S after receiving packets x1, x3, x5, x6, x8, x10,
hence the reliability of that particular secret agreement is 1.
Efficiency. E = secret size
transmitted bits
. This captures the cost of
our protocol, i.e., the amount of traffic it produces in order
to generate a secret of a given length. Maurer has formally
shown that, assuming the theoretical network conditions, the
maximum efficiency that can be achieved when we have two
terminals, Alice and Bob, is E = δE(1 − δ1), where δE
and δ1 are Eve’s and Bob’s erasure probabilities, respectively
(although he has not shown how to achieve this upper bound
using operations of bounded complexity) [17]. In the example
of Section II-B, Alice sends 10 packets in order to establish a
secret whose length corresponds to 2 packets; hence, ignoring,
Symbol Meaning
n Number of terminals
m Number of trusted interferers
Ti Terminal i
δE Erasure probability of Alice-Eve channel
Parameters used in both the Basic and Adapted protocols
N Number of x-packets transmitted by Alice
(initial phase, step 1)
N∗ Number of x-packets received by at least
one terminal (initial phase, step 1)
Ni Number of x-packets received by Ti
(initial phase, step 1)
M Number of y-packets created in the initial phase
(initial phase, step 3)
Mi Number of y-packets reconstructed by Ti
(initial phase, step 4)
L Number of s-packets created by Alice
(reconciliation phase, step 3 (Basic) or step 4 (Adapted))
Parameters used only in the Adapted protocol
Mj Number of y-packets created by terminal Tj
in the Adapted protocol (step 1, initial phase)
Ki Number of z-packets created by terminal Ti
in the Adapted protocol (step 2, reconciliation phase)
TABLE I
COMMONLY USED SYMBOLS
for the moment, the feedback sent by Bob to Alice, the
efficiency of that particular secret agreement is E = 0.2, which
is the maximum possible according to Maurer’s upper bound.
Ideally, we want our protocol to have reliability 1 and
efficiency that is equal to the known optimal for n = 2
terminals and scales well to an arbitrary number of terminals.
III. BASIC SECRET-AGREEMENT PROTOCOL
In this section, we describe a secret-agreement protocol that:
given n trusted nodes, it allows them to create a common
secret S. We will show that, assuming the theoretical network
conditions, a passive adversary obtains 0 information about S.
A. Gist
Alice first transmits N packets. Suppose that, of these, Nˆ
are commonly received by all the terminals, hence δENˆ are
received by all the terminals but not Eve. At this point, Alice
could create a secret by creating δENˆ combinations of the
Nˆ commonly received packets (as she did in the example of
Section II-B); however, Nˆ decreases exponentially with the
number of terminals, such that δENˆ quickly goes to 0. Instead,
Alice transmits a second round of packets, with the purpose of
increasing the amount of information that is commonly known
to her and all the other terminals, without increasing, as much
as possible, the amount of information known to Eve.
Hence, our protocol consists of two phases. In the initial
phase, Alice transmits N packets, which results in her sharing
some number of (different) secret packets with each terminal.
In the reconciliation phase, Alice transmits additional informa-
tion, which results in her sharing the same secret packets with
all terminals. I.e., the reconciliation phase does not increase
the number of secret packets shared by Alice and any terminal,
just “redistributes” them, such that all terminals share the same
number of secret packets.
The basic structure of the two phases is similar: Alice
first transmits some number of packets (e.g., x1, . . . x10); she
creates linear combinations of these packets (e.g., y1, y2) and
tells the other terminals how she created each combination
(e.g., that y1 = x1 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x9 and y2 = x3 ⊕ x7); each
terminal reconstructs as many linear combinations as it can
(depending on which initial packets it received). The point of
this exchange is always to “mix” the information shared by
the terminals, such that, even if Eve has overheard some of
the initial packets, she still has no information on the linear
combinations.
B. Basic Protocol Description
Initial Phase:
1) Alice transmits N packets (we will call them x-packets).
2) Each terminal Ti6=0 reliably broadcasts a feedback mes-
sage specifying which x-packets it received.
3) Alice creates M linear combinations of the x-packets
(we will call them y-packets), as described in “y-
packet construction” below. She reliably broadcasts the
coefficients she used to create the y-packets.
4) Each terminal Ti6=0 reconstructs as many (say Mi) of
the y-packets as it can.
At this point, Alice shares Mi y-packets with each terminal
Ti. If n = 2 terminals, the common secret is the concatenation
of the M1 y-packets shared with T1, S = 〈y1, . . . , yM1〉, and
the protocol terminates.
Reconciliation Phase:
1) Alice creates M −miniMi linear combinations of the
y-packets (we will call them z-packets), as described in
“z-packet construction” below. She reliably broadcasts
both the contents and the coefficients of the z-packets.
2) Each terminal Ti6=0 reconstructs all the M y-packets by
combining the Mi y-packets it reconstructed in step 4
of the initial phase with M −Mi of the z-packets.
3) Alice creates L = miniMi linear combinations of the
y-packets (we will call them s-packets), using the con-
struction specified in Lemma 6 (Appendix, Section A).
She reliably broadcasts the coefficients she used to create
all the s-packets.
4) Each terminal Ti6=0 reconstructs all the s-packets.
At this point, Alice shares the same L = miniMi s-
packets with each terminal Ti. The common secret is the
concatenation of these s-packets, S = 〈s1, . . . , sL〉, and the
protocol terminates.
y-packet construction: Alice identifies the N∗ x-packets
that were received by at least one terminal. She considers
each subset of terminals J , identifies the NJ x-packets
that were received by all the terminals in the subset but no
other terminals, and creates δENJ linear combinations of
these packets using the construction specified in Lemma 5
(Appendix, Section A). As a result, she creates δEN∗ linear
combinations. For an illustration, see Figure 1.
z-packet construction: Alice chooses the z-packets such
that: every terminal Ti6=0 can combine M−Mi z-packets with
the Mi y-packets it reconstructed in step 4 of the initial phase,
and reconstruct all the M y-packets; choosing the z-packets
can be done using standard network-coding techniques [11].
C. An Example Agreement
We will now illustrate the role of each step through a
simple example (Figure 1): Alice wants to create a common
secret with 2 other nodes, Bob and Calvin; both the Alice-Bob
channel and the Alice-Calvin channel have the same erasure
probability δ1 = δ2 = δ; the Alice-Eve channel has erasure
probability δE . Assume that Eve is a passive adversary, i.e.,
she never performs any transmissions.
In step 1 of the initial phase, Alice transmits N x-packets.
Assume that N is large enough that, at the end of this step, Bob
has received N1 → (1 − δ)N x-packets, Calvin has received
N2 → (1− δ)N x-packets, and Bob and Calvin together have
received N∗ → (1− δ2)N x-packets.
In step 3 of the initial phase, Alice creates the y-packets,
which encode all the secret information that is shared, at this
point, by Alice and each terminal separately: She creates M =
δE(1− δ2)N y-packets. Among these, there are M1 = δEN1
y-packets, which are linear combinations of the N1 x-packets
received by Bob; these encode all the information that is shared
by Alice and Bob but not Eve. Similarly, there are M2 ≈M1
y-packets, which are linear combinations of the N2 ≈ N1 x-
packets received by Calvin; these encode all the information
that is shared by Alice and Calvin but not Eve. So, at the end
of the initial phase, Alice shares M1 secret packets with Bob
and M1 (different) secret packets with Calvin.
In the reconciliation phase, Alice first tries to reach a point
where she shares with both Bob and Calvin all the M y-
packets. To this end, in step 1 of the reconciliation phase, Alice
creates the z-packets, which encode the difference between
what Bob and Calvin already know and what Alice wants them
to know: she creates and reliably broadcasts M −M1 linear
combinations of the y-packets. In step 2 of the reconciliation
phase, Bob combines the M1 y-packets he already knows with
the M−M1 linear combinations of the y-packets broadcast by
Alice and reconstructs all the M y-packets (and Calvin does
the same).
Now consider Eve: Assume that N is large enough that, at
the end of the initial phase, Eve has received ME → (1 −
δE)N
∗ of the x-packets received by either Bob or Calvin or
both. Hence, Eve cannot reconstruct any of the M = δEN∗
y-packets. In step 1 of the reconciliation phase, Alice reliably
broadcasts M −M1 linear combinations of the y-packets (in
order to fill in Bob’s and Calvin’s missing information). Eve
also receives this broadcast. Hence, at the end of step 2 of
the reconciliation phase, Eve can reconstruct M −M1 of the
y-packets.
Based on what we have said so far, at the end of step 2
of the reconciliation phase, Bob and Calvin know all M y-
packets, while Eve knows M−M1 y-packets. Hence, in step 3
of the reconciliation phase, Alice creates the s-packets, which
encode all the secret information that is shared, at this point, by
Alice, Bob, and Calvin: she creates M1 s-packets, which are
linear combinations of all the M y-packets. The concatenation
of the M1 s-packets is the common secret S.
To recap, at the end of the initial phase, Alice shares M1
different secret packets with each of Bob and Calvin, whereas
Initial Phase, Step 1
Alice transmits N x-packets
Bob receives
N1 = |X1|+ |X12| x-packets
Calvin receives
N2 = |X2|+ |X12| x-packets
Eve receives
NE x-packets
X1 X12 X2
X1: x-packets received by Bob, not Calvin
X2: x-packets received by Calvin, not Bob
X12: x-packets received by Bob and Calvin
Initial Phase, Step 3
Alice constructs M y-packets,
|Y1| = δE |X1| from X1,
|Y2| = δE |X2| from X2,
|Y12| = δE |X12| from X12.Y1 Y12 Y2
Initial Phase, Step 4
Bob reconstructs
M1 = δEN1 y-packets
Calvin reconstructs
M2 = δEN2 y-packets
Eve reconstructs
ME y-packets
Reconciliation Phase, Step 1
Alice reliably broadcasts M −M1 linear combinations of the y-packets
Reconciliation Phase, Step 2
Bob reconstructs
all the M y-packets
Calvin reconstructs
all the M y-packets
Eve reconstructs
M ′E y-packets
Reconciliation Phase, Step 3
Alice constructs M1 s-packets
Reconciliation Phase, Step 4
Bob reconstructs
all the M1 s-packets
Calvin reconstructs
all the M1 s-packets
Eve reconstructs
ME s-packets
Parameter values
N1 = N2 → (1− δ)N
NE → (1 − δE)N
M = δE(1 − δ2)N
M1 = M2 = δEN1
→ δE(1− δ)N
ME → 0
M ′E →M −M1
M1 → δE(1 − δ)N
ME → 0
Fig. 1. Alice, Bob, and Calvin establish a common secret S in the presence of passive adversary Eve.
at the end of the reconciliation phase, she shares M1 common
secret packets with both of them. So, the reconciliation phase
does not increase the amount of secret information shared by
Alice and each terminal, but “redistributes” information, such
that Alice ends up sharing the same secret information with
all the terminals.
D. Discussion of Key Points
The size of the established common secret is L =
miniMi = δE miniNi = δE(1 − maxi δi)N : the minimum
number of x-packets that are received by a terminal but not
Eve. In other words, the size of the established common secret
is determined by the weakest terminal, i.e., the one that shares
the least amount of secret information with Alice at the end
of the initial phase. This means that, if Alice can establish a
secret of size L with Bob, and then we add another terminal,
Calvin, who has better connectivity to Alice than Bob, then
the three terminals can establish a common secret of the same
size L—i.e., adding Calvin to the group will not decrease the
size of the established secret.
So, increasing the number of terminals from 2 to n does
not necessarily decrease the size of the established common
secret. For instance, if all the terminals have identical channels
(δi = δ, ∀i), then the size of the established common secret is
L = δE(1−δ)N , which is equal to the size of the secret estab-
lished between two terminals in the example of Section II-B.
Moreover, the extra transmissions that Alice has to make in the
reconciliation phase are M − δE(1− δ)N ≤ N− δE(1− δ)N ,
i.e., M is upper-bounded by a constant that is independent of
n. As we will see in the analysis section, this independence
from n is key to the scalability of our protocol.
Linear coding is used to two different effects by our
protocol: (1) As a means to fill in the information missing from
each terminal by transmitting the minimum number of packets:
In step 1 of the reconciliation phase, the M − miniMi z-
packets are linear combinations of the M y-packets; given that
each terminal already knows at least miniMi y-packets from
the initial phase, it can reconstruct all M y-packets. (2) As a
means to perform privacy amplification, i.e., combine all the
information known to the terminals but not to Eve: In step 3 of
the initial phase, Alice creates δEN∗ y-packets that are linear
combinations of the N∗ x-packets received by at least one
terminal; assuming Eve has missed δEN∗ of these x-packets,
she cannot reconstruct any of the y-packets. Similarly, in step
3 of the reconciliation phase, Alice creates miniMi s-packets
that are linear combinations of the M y-packets known to all
the terminals; assuming Eve has missed miniMi y-packets,
she cannot reconstruct any of the s-packets.
Point (2) assumes that N (hence also N∗) is large enough
that, if the Alice-Eve channel has erasure probability δE ,
then Eve misses close to δEN∗ of the N∗ x-packets. Of
course, it is theoretically possible that Eve gets lucky and
receives significantly more x-packets than expected; however,
by picking the right value for N , we can make this event
arbitrarily unlikely (e.g., as likely as Eve correctly guessing the
value of the secret S by randomly picking a number between
0 and |S|). In Section VII, where we present our experimental
results, we show exactly how much information Eve collects
about every generated common secret S.
IV. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
In this section, we state certain properties of the Basic
secret-agreement protocol and also present a formal argument
on why we chose this particular protocol over a more obvious
alternative.
Lemma 1. If the theoretical network conditions hold, there
exists a sufficiently large N for which the Basic secret-
agreement protocol is information-theoretically secure against
a passive adversary.
Lemma 2. If the theoretical network conditions hold, there
exists a sufficiently large N for which the Basic secret-
agreement protocol achieves efficiency
E =
δE(1− δ)
1 + δE(δ −∆) ,
where δ = maxi{δi} and ∆ = δ1δ2 . . . δn−1.
To give a sense of the achieved efficiency, we consider the
case where δi = δE (all the channels between Alice and
any node are identical) and plot, in Figure 2 (solid lines),
the efficiency of our protocol as a function of the erasure
probability of the channels, for different values of the number
of terminals n. The bell-shape of the curve is explained as
follows: when the erasure probability is 0, Eve misses none
Fig. 2. Efficiency of secret agreement as a function of the erasure probability
of the channels (assuming identical erasure channels) for our protocol (solid
lines) and the alternative protocol (dashed lines).
of the packets transmitted by Alice, which means that Alice
cannot establish any secret with the other terminals, no matter
how many packets she transmits—hence, the efficiency of the
protocol is 0; when the erasure probability is 1, Eve misses
all of the packets transmitted by Alice, but so do all the other
terminals, so, again, the efficiency of the protocol is 0; the
maximum efficiency is achieved somewhere in between (at
erasure probability 0.5 when we have n = 2 terminals, and at√
2 − 1 when n → ∞). The shift of the maximum point is
due to the additional (by at most N −miniMi) transmissions
performed in the reconciliation phase. Note that, as the number
of terminals goes to infinity, the maximum efficiency of our
protocol approaches 20%—a substantial non-zero value.
The Basic protocol scales well with the number of terminals
because we try to leverage broadcasting as much as possible.
If we were, instead, to require pairwise secret establishment
between Alice and each terminal, efficiency would quickly
go to 0 with the number of terminals. To see this, consider
the following, conceptually simpler alternative to the Basic
protocol: Alice establishes a separate secret Si with each other
terminal Ti (using the initial phase of the Basic protocol)
and uses Si to convey a common secret S to each Ti (e.g.,
reliability broadcasts Mi = S⊕Si for all i 6= 0). Its efficiency
is E(alt) = δE(1−δ)1+(n−2)δE(1−δ) , where δ = maxi δi. Figure 2
shows this efficiency (dashed lines), plotted against the effi-
ciency of the Basic protocol (solid lines), as a function of the
erasure probability of the channels, assuming all channels are
identical. Notice that, unlike the efficiency of our protocol,
E(alt) quickly goes to zero as the number of terminals n
increases.
Lemma 3. If the theoretical network conditions hold, then,
for n = 2 terminals, the Basic protocol achieves maximum
efficiency.
This is directly derived from Lemma 2: for n = 2 terminals,
we achieve efficiency E = δE(1−δ1), which is the maximum
possible [17].
Lemma 4. Each terminal that participates in the Basic
protocol executes an algorithm that is polynomial in N .
The proofs of Lemmas 1 and 4 are in the Appendix,
Section A. We omit the proof of Lemma 2, which is straight-
forward.
V. AUTHENTICATION
The Basic protocol is information-theoretically secure
against passive adversaries, but is vulnerable to active attacks:
what if Eve impersonates a terminal, participates in the pro-
tocol, and learns the common secret?
To protect against impersonation attacks, the (true) terminals
need to share an initial common secret σ, of sufficient size
to authenticate each other until they successfully complete
one round of the Basic protocol; once they have successfully
completed a round (and generated a new common secret S
with |S| ≫ |σ|), they can use a part of S to authenticate each
other until the next successful round completion.
Since we are aiming for information-theoretic security,
the terminals use an unconditionally secure authentication
code [10]. Such a code provides a function auth(µ, σ), which
returns an authenticator α for message µ given key σ, such
that: an entity that does not know σ can generate a valid
message/authenticator pair (launch a successful impersonation
attack) with probability 1|A| , where |A| is the size of the
authenticator space.
Choosing at which step(s) of the Basic protocol to perform
the authentication involves a trade-off between efficiency and
the adversary model that we want to consider: At one extreme,
each terminal appends an authentication code to every single
packet it transmits or reliability broadcasts. At the other
extreme, the terminals authenticate each other only at the last
step of the reconciliation phase (i.e., each terminal obtains
proof that all the other terminals with which it has created
a common secret know the initial common secret σ). The
former requires a significantly larger σ to provide information-
theoretic guarantees (because it reveals many more authentica-
tors to the adversary). The latter makes the protocol vulnerable
to a simple denial-of-service attack: in every protocol round,
Eve impersonates a terminal and learns the common secret; at
the end of the reconciliation phase, she fails to authenticate
herself to the (true) terminals, causing the common secret to
be discarded and the protocol to restart.
We chose a solution in the middle, which, in our opinion,
offers a good balance: authentication happens at the end of
the initial phase, after step 4:
4-A Alice performs pair-wise authentication (described be-
low) with each terminal Ti6=0, using the y-packets that
Ti has reconstructed and the initial common secret σ.
If Alice fails to authenticate herself to Ti, Ti stops
participating in the protocol. If Ti fails to authenticate
itself to Alice, Alice excludes Ti from the agreement and
discards all the y-packets that Ti has reconstructed.
Pair-wise authentication consists of the following steps:
1) Alice concatenates W bits selected from the y-packets
that Ti has reconstructed in the initial phase, step 4,
creates a message µi that contains this concatenation,
and reliably broadcasts αi = auth(µi, σ).
2) Ti creates a message µ′i in the same way and checks
whether αi = auth(µ′i, σ). If yes, Alice has successfully
authenticated herself to Ti, otherwise, she has failed.
3) Ti concatenates a different set of W bits from the y-
packets that it has reconstructed in the initial phase, step
4, creates a message νi that contains this concatenation,
and reliably broadcasts βi = auth(νi, σ).
4) Alice creates a message ν′i in the same way and checks
whether βi = auth(ν′i, σ). If yes, Ti has successfully
authenticated itself to Alice, otherwise, it has failed.
Regarding the size of the relevant parameters: Since we are
using an unconditionally secure authentication code, Eve can
launch a successful impersonation attack with probability 1|σ| ;
for |σ| = 32 bits, this becomes 0.232 · 10−9. We authenticate
messages of size W ; unconditionally secure authentication
codes require a key of twice the size of the authenticated
message, hence W = |σ|/2 = 16 bits.
Now suppose that Eve is an active adversary. First, she
impersonates a terminal other than Alice. In this case, Eve
fails to authenticate herself to Alice (initial phase, step 4-A)
because she does not know σ, causing Alice to exclude her
from the agreement. This means that Alice discards all the
y-packets that Eve has reconstructed, hence, at the end of the
initial phase, Eve cannot reconstruct any of the (remaining) y-
packets, i.e., she is in the same position as a passive adversary.
Second, suppose that Eve impersonates Alice. In this case, Eve
fails to authenticate herself to any of the other terminals (initial
phase, step 4-A) because she does not know σ, causing the
terminals to stop talking to her.
VI. ADAPTING TO A REAL NETWORK
In this section, we describe how we adapt our secret-
agreement protocol to a small wireless testbed (14 m2), where
the theoretical network conditions do not hold. Instead, we
use interferers to introduce noise and ensure that an adversary
does not receive all the packets received by any terminal, as
long as she has a minimum physical distance (1.76 m) from
each terminal.
A. Setup and First Try
Our testbed (Figure 3) covers a square area of 14 m2. We use
m = 6 interferers, which are WARP nodes [15], each with two
directional antennae, each with a narrow 3-dB 22-degree beam.
We deploy up to n = 8 terminals and one adversary, Eve,
which are Asus WL-500gP wireless routers running 802.11g
(at 2.472 GHz, transmit power 3 dBm) in ad-hoc mode. During
our experiments, when a terminal transmits, it sends 100-byte
packets at a rate of 1 Mbps.
We logically divide the testbed area in 3 rows and 3 columns
of equal width, place Eve in one of the 9 logical cells, and the
terminals in various positions around her, but not in the same
cell. Our rationale is the following: if a group of wireless nodes
want to exchange a secret, it is reasonable to require from
each of them to stand at least some minimum distance away
from any other wireless node. In our testbed, this minimum
distance is 1.76 m (the diagonal of a logical cell), and, as
we explain below, it was determined by the shape of the
interferers’ beams; with a narrower beam, we would have
achieved a smaller minimum distance.
EveT2
T3
T4
T5
T0T1
1.
25
m
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6m
Fig. 3. A testbed configuration. The six round nodes (Ti) are trusted terminals
that are trying to establish a common secret S . The square node (Eve) is an
adversary whose goal is to guess S .
We place the interfering antennae along the perimeter of
the covered area (3 on each side); we turn them on and off,
such that, at any point in time, one pair of antennae creates
noise along a row, while another pair creates noise along
a column; since we have 9 row/column combinations, there
are 9 different noise patterns. To choose the width of the
rows/columns, we performed a simple calibration using only
two interfering antennae: we placed the antennae at opposite
ends of the first row; we chose the width of the row to be
the maximum width such that, when the antennae were on,
any wireless node located in the row did not receive any other
signal transmitted from within the 14 m2 covered area. Hence,
the number of rows and columns was determined by the shape
of the interfering antennae’s beams; a narrower beam would
have resulted in more rows and columns given the same area.
Each experiment is divided in time slots; at the beginning
of each time slot, we turn on different interferers, such that,
by the end of the experiment, we have rotated through all 9
noise patterns.
The goal of rotating noise patterns is to emulate independent
packet-erasure channels: Suppose Alice transmits N x-packets
during each experiment, equally spread across the 9 time slots.
Assume that, during each time slot, each node located in the
row or the column that are interfered with receives 0 of Alice’s
packets, while each of the remaining nodes receives all of
Alice’s packets. Now consider the positioning of the terminals
shown in Figure 3. Because terminal T1 is on the same row
with Eve, 2 out of the 9 noise patterns affect Eve but not T1;
hence, if, during an experiment, Alice transmits N packets,
0.22N of these packets are received by T1 but not Eve. This
is the same outcome that we would have, if the Alice-Ti and
Alice-Eve channels were independent, with δE(1−δ1) = 0.22.
Our First Try. The reason why we need the theoretical
network conditions in the Basic protocol is that they guarantee
two facts: (i) each terminal Ti receives Mi = δENi x-
packets that are not received by Eve, and (ii) the union of all
terminals receives M = δEN∗ x-packets that are not received
by Eve. These two numbers determine the main parameters
of the protocol, namely how many y-packets (M ), z-packets
(M −minMi), and s-packets (L = minMi) Alice creates.
In our testbed, we expected our controlled interference to
ensure two similar facts: (i) each terminal Ti receives at least
minMi = 0.22N x-packets that are not received by Eve, and
(ii) the union of all terminals receives at least M x-packets
that are not received by Eve, where M can be computed
based on the number of cells occupied by terminals (we skip
the computation for lack of space). Hence, even though the
theoretical network conditions do not hold, we still know how
many y-, z- and s-packets Alice should create.
However, this rationale assumes that, when Alice transmits,
all the nodes that are located in an interfered-with row or
column receive nothing, while the rest receive everything.
It turned out that, in practice, this cannot be guaranteed
with probability 1, due to random channel-propagation effects,
which creates two new problems: (1) Zero secret size: in rare,
but statistically significant occasions, during an experiment,
Eve receives all the x-packets received by one of the terminals,
i.e., minMi = 0, which means that the terminals cannot create
any common secret at all. (2) Unpredictable secret size:
the value of minMi varies significantly between experiments,
which means that the terminals do not know how big a secret
they should create (such that Eve has 0 information about it).
To address these two problems, we adapt our secret-agreement
protocol as described in the next three sections.
B. Gist
To address the “zero secret size” problem, we make all the
terminals take turns in transmitting x-packets. The idea is to
make each terminal Ti receive information through multiple
different channels (as opposed to receiving information only
from Alice), making it unlikely that Eve will collect the
same information with Ti. In particular, Eve collects the same
information with terminal Ti only when: for every single
terminal Tj 6=i, the channel between Tj and Ti happens to be
the same with the channel between Tj and Eve, throughout the
experiment. This never happened in any of the experiments
that we ran.
To address the “unpredictable secret size” problem, we
estimate the amount of information that Eve collects based on
the information collected by the terminals. I.e., we essentially
pretend that each terminal Ti is Eve and that all the other
terminals want to establish a common secret that is unknown
to Ti; since we know which packets were received by each
terminal (including Ti), we can compute exactly what the size
of this supposed secret should be. Then we combine all these
computations to estimate the size of the actual common secret.
We made this last choice based on the following obser-
vations: Channel behavior varies significantly over time, to
the point where we cannot estimate or even upper-bound how
much information Eve collects during one experiment based on
how much information she collected during past experiments.
Channel behavior also varies over space, but less so: if, during
an experiment, node Ti receives many packets in common with
neighbor Tj , then node Ti most likely receives many packets
in common with its other neighbors as well. It turns out that,
by measuring how many packets each pair of neighboring
terminals receive in common during one experiment, we can
estimate quite accurately how many packets any terminal and
Eve receive in common in the same experiment.
C. Adapted Protocol Description
Initial Phase: For j = 1..n:
1) Terminal Tj transmits N packets (we will call them x-
packets).
2) Each terminal Ti6=j reliably broadcasts a feedback mes-
sage specifying which x-packets it received.
3) Tj does the following:
a) It counts the number of x-packets Ni received by
terminal Ti, for all i 6= j.
b) It counts the number of x-packets Mik received by
both Ti and Tk, for all i, k 6= j.
c) It computes δ˜i = maxk MikNi for all i 6= j.
d) It computes δ˜E = maxi δ˜i.
e) It performs step 3 of the initial phase of the Basic
protocol, using δE = δ˜E .
As a result, Tj creates M j = δ˜EN linear combinations
of the x-packets (we will call them y-packets) and
reliably broadcasts the coefficients it used to create them.
4) Each terminal Ti6=j reconstructs as many (say Mi) of
the M j y-packets as it can (based on the x-packets it
received in step 1).
Reconciliation Phase:
1) Alice identifies which Mi y-packets are known to each
terminal Ti. She provides them as input to the program
specified in the Appendix, Section C, which outputs
a non-negative integer Ki for all i. Then she reliably
broadcasts all the Ki.
2) Each terminal Ti creates Ki linear combinations of the
Mi y-packets that it reconstructed in the initial phase
(we will call them z-packets). It reliably broadcasts both
the contents and the coefficients of the z-packets.
3) Each terminal Ti combines the z-packets it received with
the y-packets it reconstructed in the initial phase, and
reconstructs all the M =
∑
jM
j y-packets.
4) Alice creates L = M − ∑iKi linear combinations
of the M y-packets (we will call them s-packets),
using the construction specified in Lemma 6 (Section A,
Appendix). She reliably broadcasts the coefficients she
used to create all the s-packets.
5) Each terminal Ti reconstructs all the s-packets. The
common secret is their concatenation S = 〈s1, . . . , sL〉.
D. Discussion of Key Points
We illustrate the key points of the protocol by considering
again the example where Alice, Bob, and Calvin want to
establish a common secret S in the presence of passive
eavesdropper Eve.
The first difference from the Basic protocol is that we do
not know how many x-packets Eve receives in common with
each terminal, so, we estimate it based on how many x-packets
various pairs of terminals receive in common (initial phase,
step 3). For instance, suppose that, in step 1 of the initial
phase, Alice transmits N = 10 x-packets, Bob receives x1,
x2, x3, x4, x7, and x8, while Calvin receives x1, x3, x5, and
x6. Hence, Bob receives N1 = 6 x-packets, Calvin receives
N2 = 4 x-packets, Bob and Calvin together receive a total of
N∗ = 8 x-packets, while they receive M12 = 2 x-packets in
common. Hence, in step 3 of the initial phase, Alice computes
δ˜1 = 0.33, δ˜2 = 0.5, and δ˜E = 0.5, and she creates a total of
M0 = δ˜EN
∗ = 4 y-packets.
What we lose relative to the Basic protocol is that we cannot
guarantee a minimum reliability, because we do not know how
much information Eve collects during the initial phase: It is
possible that Eve receives more x-packets in common with
the terminals than we estimate, which means that, at the end
of the initial phase, she knows some fraction of the M y-
packets, hence, at the end of the reconciliation phase, she
knows some information about the L s-packets. Note that this
does not mean that Eve knows the common secret S, only
that she knows some information about it, which increases
her probability of guessing it right.
A side-effect of estimating the amount of information
collected by Eve based on the information collected by the
terminals is that the performance of the protocol depends
on the number of terminals n: the more terminals we have,
the more we learn about the quality of channels throughout
the network, hence we can estimate the quality of Eve’s
channels better. For instance, if we have only n = 3 terminals,
when Alice transmits, she estimates how many x-packets were
received in common by Bob and Eve based on how many x-
packets were received in common by Bob and Calvin; if it
happens that the channel from Alice to Eve is significantly
different from the channel from Alice to Bob, then the estimate
is inaccurate. For n = 2 terminals, the protocol does not work
at all, because Alice has no way of estimating how many x-
packets Bob received in common with Eve.
The second difference from the Basic protocol is that the
terminals take turns in transmitting x-packets (initial phase,
step 1) and creating y-packets (initial phase, step 3). Hence,
at the end of the initial phase, there exists no terminal that
knows all the y-packets, and the reconciliation needs to happen
in a distributed manner: we need to solve a program that takes
as input which terminal knows which y-packets and outputs
how many z-packets (linear combinations of y-packets) each
terminal needs to reliably broadcast, such that all terminals
learn all the y-packets (reconciliation phase, steps 1 and 2).
What we lose relative to the Basic protocol is that we cannot
guarantee a minimum efficiency, because we do not know
how much information the terminals will have to broadcast
during the reconciliation phase: At the end of the initial
phase, all the terminals together have created M y-packets,
where M depends on network conditions. In the reconciliation
phase, all the terminals together broadcast K z-packets (linear
combinations of y-packets), where K also depends on network
conditions. Hence, at the end of the reconciliation phase, Eve
knows at least K of the M y-packets, and the terminals
create L = M − K s-packets (linear combinations of the
y-packets). This means that the efficiency of the protocol is
M−K
nN+M−K , which depends on the network conditions during
the experiment.
In summary, once we do not assume perfect knowledge of
network conditions, we cannot offer formal guarantees about
the reliability and efficiency of a protocol that relies precisely
on these network conditions to generate a secret; we have
to assess its reliability and efficiency experimentally, for the
particular space where we want to deploy it.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the Adapted
secret-agreement protocol in our testbed.
When we refer to an “experiment,” we mean that we place
n terminals and Eve on the area covered by our testbed, such
that each cell is occupied by at most one node, and we run one
round of the Adapted protocol. We run one such experiment
for each possible positioning of n terminals and Eve, and we
run one such set of experiments for n = 3 to 8 terminals.
For instance, we run 504 experiments with n = 3 terminals
(because there are 504 different ways to position 3 terminals
and Eve on our testbed), while we run 9 experiment with
n = 8 terminals (because there are 9 different ways to position
8 terminals and Eve on our testbed).
A. Efficiency and Reliability of the Adapted Protocol
Each graph we present shows efficiency or reliability as
a function of the number of terminals n; for each value
of n, we show three values: “minimum” is the minimum
efficiency/reliability achieved during any experiment with n
terminals; “average” is the average of the efficiency/reliability
achieved across all experiments with n terminals; “50th quar-
tile” and “95th quartile” is the minimum efficiency/reliability
achieved during 50% and 95% of the experiments with n
terminals.
Figure 4(a) shows the efficiency of the Adapted protocol:
For n = 8 terminals, it has minimum efficiency Emin =
0.038; given that the terminals transmit at rate 1 Mbps, this
efficiency yields 38 secret Kbps. For n = 6 terminals, Emin =
0.028, which yields 28 secret Kbps. The reason efficiency
decreases with the number of terminals is related to the “zero
secret size” problem (Section VI): when Alice transmits, it is
possible that Eve receive all the x-packets received by Bob (if
the Alice-Bob channel happens to be the same with the Alice-
Eve channel); we side-stepped this problem by making all the
terminals transmit x-packets, thereby creating more channel
diversity; however, the fewer the terminals we have, the less
the diversity we create, hence the more likely it is for Eve to
receive a large fraction of the x-packets received by Bob (or
any one terminal).
Figure 4(b) shows the reliability of the Adapted protocol:
For n = 8 terminals, it has minimum reliability Rmin = 1,
i.e., in any experiment, Eve can correctly guess the value of a
secret bit with probability 2−1 = 0.5 and the value of an
s-packet with probability 2−800 → 0 (each packet is 800
bits). For n = 6 terminals, Rmin = 0.2, i.e., in the worst
case, Eve can correctly guess the value of a secret bit with
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Fig. 4. Performance of the Adapted protocol as a function of the number
of terminals n. For n = 8 terminals, we generate at least 38 secret Kbps
with minimum reliability 1. For n = 7 and 6 terminals, we generate at least
28 secret Kbps with minimum reliability below 1, but such that Eve still has
negligible probability of correctly guessing an s-packet. For fewer terminals,
Eve’s probability of correctly guessing an s-packet becomes non-negligible.
probability 2−0.2 = 0.87, but the value of an s-packet still with
probability 2−0.2·800 → 0. The reason reliability decreases
with the number of terminals is related to the “unpredictable
secret size” problem (Section VI): each terminal estimates how
many y-packets to create based on information provided by
the other terminals; the fewer the terminals, the less accurate
the estimate, hence the more likely it is to create more y-
packets than are secret to Eve. Note that the “bad” experiments
(where we achieve very low reliability) are relatively few: for
n = 6 terminals, in 95% of the experiments (i.e., possible node
placements), Rmin = 0.5, i.e., Eve can correctly guess the
value of a secret bit with probability 0.7 and an s-packet with
probability 2−0.5·800 → 0. Also, for any number of terminals,
in at least half of the node placements, we achieve minimum
reliability 1 (the 50% quartile in Fig. 4(b) is always 1).
B. Privacy Amplification
In the Adapted protocol, each terminal generates as many y-
packets as (it estimates to be) possible, such that these packets
remain secret from Eve; as we saw in the last section, for fewer
than 8 terminals, this results in creating a larger secret than
appropriate, hence achieving reliability well below 1.
One practical—if not elegant—way of increasing reliability
would be to add a conservative privacy-amplification step at
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Fig. 5. Performance of the Adapted protocol when using privacy amplifi-
cation. The plot shows minimum reliability as a function of the number of
terminals n, for different target secret bitstream rates. For n = 6 terminals,
we get minimum reliability 1 for 5 secret Kbps or less. For n = 5 terminals,
we get minimum reliability 1 for 0.5 secret Kbps or less.
the end of the reconciliation phase of the Adapted protocol:
instead of creating L = M − ∑iKi linear combinations
of the y-packets, create αL combinations, where α ∈ (0, 1)
depends on the target secret bitstream rate that we want to
generate. For instance, with n = 6 terminals, the Adapted
protocol yields a 28 Kbps bitstream, but achieves minimum
reliability 0.2, because it creates a larger secret than it should;
if we only care to generate a 1 Kbps secret bitstream, then
we can instruct the protocol to create 0.035L s-packets at the
end of the reconciliation phase, which would result in higher
reliability.
Figure 5 shows the minimum reliability that we get as a
function of the number of terminals n, for different target
secret bitstream rates: if we instruct our protocol to generate 5
secret Kbps, we get minimum reliability Rmin = 1 for n = 6
or more terminals; if we instruct our protocol to generate
0.5 secret Kbps, we get minimum reliability Rmin = 1 for
n = 5 or more terminals. This suggests that our protocol could
achieve higher reliability by adapting its secret-generation rate
according to the number of participating terminals; exploring
how exactly to perform this adaptation is part of our future
work.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the limitations of our proposal,
outline ideas on how to address them, and state open chal-
lenges.
Collusion. We can model collusion by assuming that Eve is
physically present in many network locations at the same time;
in that case, she can use the union of the packets received at all
locations to compromise the security of the common secret.
In the theoretical model, this scenario is straightforward to
address: by being present in many locations, Eve essentially
decreases her erasure probability δE ; hence, the Basic protocol
does not need to change, it only needs to use Eve’s effective
erasure probability. In a real testbed, we will have to be more
conservative about the number of y-packets (hence, common
secret) we create, depending on the level of collusion we want
to prevent. For instance, suppose that Eve may be present in
up to two network locations; Alice will have to estimate how
many packets Bob and Eve received in common based on how
many packets Bob, Calvin, and some other terminal received
in common (as opposed to considering only Bob and Calvin).
We expect the cost to be reduced efficiency.
Less controlled environment. Our testbed implies a con-
trolled environment, e.g., a military facility, where (i) we can
rely on trusted interferers to create artificial noise, and (ii)
we can assume that nodes located outside the perimeter of the
testbed cannot overhear transmissions initiated from within the
perimeter (e.g., because the testbed is within walls that are
resistive to outgoing radio signals). Our ultimate goal is not a
such controlled environment. We plan to explore the idea of
having the terminals themselves generate the necessary noise,
such that we do not require trusted interferers or well defined
boundaries.
Eve has a custom physical layer. In our testbed, Eve
possesses a standard physical layer, which means that she
cannot recover packets that are discarded by her physical
layer. One might argue that, if she had access to a custom
physical layer, she could buffer these packets and collect some
amount of information from them (because, presumably, not
all the bits of a discarded packet are received incorrectly). Even
though we did not perform experiments with custom hardware,
we have some evidence that our results would still hold: we
measured the bit error rate experienced by a terminal located
in a row or column that is interfered with, for a wide range of
packet sizes; we found that the bit error rate remains constant,
independently from the packet size; this is consistent with our
expectation that, when a packet is lost due to our artificial
interference, most of its bits are received incorrectly by the
physical layer of the device.
Eve has directional antennae. In our testbed, Eve is
a commodity wireless node. One might argue that, if she
had access to larger and/or directional antennae, she could
use them to cancel out the interferes’ noise. Making our
interference robust to such attacks is something we want to
explore in our future work. However, we should note that our
interference is nearly omnidirectional, hence we expect larger
and/or directional antennae not to make it significantly easier
for Eve to cancel it out.
Residual uncertainty. In our testbed, we achieve reliability
below 1 in certain experiments, which is a result of the
“unpredictable secret size” problem (Section VI). We want to
improve this through more sophisticated interference, e.g., by
using beam forming. However, we would like to note that some
level of uncertainty will be unavoidable in a real network.
This is similar to the uncertainty that exists in different
settings, e.g., electromagnetic emissions modeling in side-
channel attacks [8], [9]. In Quantum Key Distribution as well,
experimental deployments still have uncertainty limitations
w.r.t. the idealized system—these limitations were especially
severe in the first deployments [7].
Jamming attacks. If Eve employs a jamming radio signal,
she can disrupt all communication and cause a denial-of-
service attack. However, she then reveals her presence, and
homing tools can be used to geographically locate her. Such
attacks are endemic to wireless communications, and several
methods have been proposed to counteract them, including
use of spread-spectrum, priority messages, lower duty cycle,
region mapping, and mode change [35], [36].
Artificial noise is necessary. When we started this work,
we did not consider using artificial noise; instead, we were
planning to rely on the natural wireless channel conditions. We
found that any node’s (hence, also Eve’s) erasure probability
under natural network conditions can be very low (on the order
of 10−3), which means that, unless we artificially increase it,
secret generation will be very slow (on the order of a few bits
per second).
Moving beyond idealized modeling. A valid criticism
of information-theoretical security is that the security proofs
assume idealized models; we also started by assuming an
idealized model, but took two further steps: (i) we attempted to
artificially create network conditions that emulate the idealized
model and (ii) we adapted our basic protocol to these network
conditions. Ours is a proof-of-concept first attempt to emulate
an idealized model: we could do more careful modeling of
the natural wireless environment and the received signals, and
we could use more sophisticated antennae, as well as more
carefully calibrated interference. Still, we believe that our
results are promising, not only in their own merit, but also
because they indicate that it might be possible, with similar
methods, to translate other protocols that assume idealized
models to practical systems.
IX. RELATED WORK
⊲ Information-theoretical secrecy with idealized model: In
a seminal paper on “wiretap” channels, Wyner [16] pioneered
the notion that one can establish information-theoretic secrecy
between Alice and Bob by utilizing the noisy broadcast nature
of wireless transmissions. However, his scheme works only
with perfect knowledge of Eve’s channel and only if Eve has
a worse channel than Bob. In a subsequent seminal work, Mau-
rer [17] showed the value of feedback from Bob to Alice, even
if Eve hears all the feedback transmissions (i.e., the feedback
channel is public). He showed that even if the channel from
Alice to Eve is better than that to Bob, feedback allows Alice
and Bob to create a key which is information-theoretically
secure from Eve. This line of work has led to a rich set
of literature on pairwise unconditional secret-key agreement
with public discussion (see [18] and references therein). In
[19], the authors proposed increasing pairwise secrecy through
friendly jamming, but still assuming perfect knowledge of
Eve’s channel. The problem of key agreement between a set
of terminals with access to noisy broadcast channel and public
discussion channel (visible to the eavesdropper) was studied
in [20], where some achievable secrecy rates were established,
assuming Eve does not have access to the noisy broadcast
transmissions. This was generalized in [21] by developing
(non-computable) outer bounds for secrecy rates. To the best of
our knowledge, ours is the first work to consider multi-terminal
secret key agreement over erasure networks, when Eve also has
access to the noisy broadcast transmissions. Moreover, unlike
the works in [16], [17], [21] that assume infinite complexity
operations, our scheme is computationally efficient.
⊲ Practical protocols for pairwise secrecy: The fact that we
establish information-theoretic secrecy for a group of nodes
fundamentally distinguishes our work from a class of protocols
recently proposed in the literature, which aim to extract
pairwise information theoretical secrecy from physical channel
characteristics. This class of protocols establishes secret keys
between two parties, Alice and Bob, in the presence of a
passive adversary Eve, building on different characteristics of
physical signals, such as UHF channel values [22], Rayleigh
fading [23], channel impulse responses [24], [25], ultra-wide
band (UWB) channel properties [26], and phase reciprocity
[27]. These works leverage the reciprocity of the physical
wireless channel between Alice and Bob to establish a com-
mon secret between them; Closer to our work are perhaps
[28] and [29], although they still generate pairwise secrecy
without interaction. The work in [28] is the only paper, as
far as we know, which employs erasures; the work in [29]
has Bob deliberately introduce errors into the transmissions
of Alice to confuse Eve. Unlike our work, all these schemes
offer modest secrecy rates (for example of the order 10 bits/s
by the scheme in [24]) which is orders of magnitude lower
than what our scheme can achieve. Moreover, they rely on the
reciprocity of the channel between Alice and Bob, and thus
do not scale well as the number of nodes increases. Similarly,
to achieve pairwise secrecy, a recent work [30] proposes to
artificially enhance the randomness of the channel fading. In
contrast, in this work we use active interference to emulate
noisy (erasure) channel conditions that we then utilize to create
the appropriate channel conditions for group secrecy.
⊲ Computational group secrecy: Group secret key genera-
tion with computational security guarantees has also received
significant attention (see [31], [32] and references therein).
X. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a protocol that enables a group of
nodes, connected to the same broadcast channel, to exchange
a common secret bitstream in the presence of an adversary.
Our protocol does not use public-key (or any classic form of)
cryptography and relies, instead, on the assumption that an
eavesdropper may overhear big chunks of the communication
between the other nodes, but cannot overhear all the bits re-
ceived by any single node. The key properties that differentiate
our protocol from prior theoretical work are that it works for an
arbitrary number of nodes, has polynomial complexity, and is
implementable in simple devices without any changes to their
physical or MAC layers. On the practical side, as a proof of
concept, we adapted our protocol to a small wireless testbed of
14 m2 and presented an experimental demonstration of n = 8
wireless nodes generating a 38 Kbps common secret bitstream
in the presence of an adversary (located at least 1.76 m away
from any other node). To the best of our knowledge, ours
is the first experimental evidence of generating information-
theoretically secret bits at kilobit-per-second rates.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Eve has two occasions to obtain information about the secret
S: in step 1 of the initial phase, she receives NE x-packets;
in step 1 of the reconciliation phase, she receives the M − L
z-packets that are reliably broadcast by Alice. According to
Lemmas 5 and 6, Eve obtains no information about S in either
occasion. In Lemma 7 we prove exponential convergence to
the average values. 
Lemma 5. Consider a set of N x-packets, say x1, . . . , xN ,
and assume Eve has a subset of size NE of the x-packets.
Construct N −NE y-packets, say y1, . . . , yM , as
Y = AX,
where matrix X has as rows the N x-packets, matrix Y has
as rows the N−NE y-packets, and A is the generator matrix
of a Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) linear code with
parameters [N,N −NE, NE +1] (e.g., a Reed-Solomon code
[12]). Then the M y-packets are information-theoretically
secure from Eve, irrespective of which subset (of size NE)
of the x-packets Eve has.
Proof: ⊲Let W be a matrix that has as rows the packets Eve
has. To prove that the y-packets are information-theoretically
secure from Eve, we must show that:
H(Y |W ) = H(Y ).
⊲ We can write[
Y
W
]
=
[
A
AE
]
X
def
= BX,
where AE is a NE ×N matrix of rank(AE) = NE , which
specifies the NE distinct x-packets that are known to Eve. AE
is not known to us, however we know is that in each row of
AE there is only one 1 and the remaining elements are zero;
so all of the vectors in the row span of AE have Hamming
weight (the number of nonzero elements of a vector [12]) less
than or equal to NE . On the other hand, from construction,
rank(A) = N − NE , and each vector in the row span of A
has Hamming weight larger than or equal to NE+1 [12]; thus
the row span of A and AE are disjoint (except for the zero
vector) and the matrix B is full-rank, i.e. rank (B) = N .
⊲ If the packets xi have length Λ, we have that:
H(Y |W ) = H(Y,W )−H(W ) =
= rank (B) Λ− rank(AE)Λ = (N −NE)Λ
= rank(A)Λ = H(Y ). 
Lemma 6. Consider a set of M y-packets, say y1, . . . , yM ,
and a set of M − L z-packets, say z1, . . . , zM−L, related as
Z = AZY,
where matrix Y has as rows the M y-packets, matrix Z has as
rows the M−L z-packets, and AZ is a known M−L×M full
rank matrix. Assume that Eve knows all the z-packets. Using
any standard basis-extension method [13], find an L × M
matrix AS , with rank (AS) = L, such that
rank
([
AS
AZ
])
= M.
Then we can construct L s-packets, say s1, . . . , sL, as
S = ASY,
where matrix S has as rows the s-packets, that are
information-theoretically secure from Eve.
Proof: To prove that the s-packets are information-
theoretically secure from Eve, we need to show that H(S|Z) =
H(S). Similarly to the proof of Lemma 5, if the y-packets have
length Λ, we have that:
H(S|Z) = H(S, Z)−H(Z) = rank
([
AS
AZ
])
Λ−
− rank (AZ) Λ = LΛ = rank (AS) Λ = H(S). 
Lemma 7. The values of the parameters in Lemma 1 converge
exponentially fast in N to their expected values.
Proof: Let us consider the random variables M , Mi,
and L defined in Section III. For convenience, we will work
with the normalized random variables M , M/N , MTi ,
MTi/N , and L , L/N . Define the random variable η
(i)
j as
η
(i)
j =


1 if the jth x-packet is received
by Ti but not by Eve,
0 otherwise.
Then we can write M i = 1N
∑N
j=1 η
(i)
j and we have µ =
µi , E
[
M i
]
= (1 − δ)δE . As defined before, we have also
L = miniM i. Now the efficiency E = L1+M−L calculated in
Lemma 2 itself is a random variable, and using the Chernoff
bound we can show that it concentrates exponentially fast in
N to δE(1−δ)1+δE(δ−∆) . It is easy to see that E
[
L
]
= (1−δ)δE def= µ
and µM , E
[
M
]
= (1 − δm−1)δE . Using concentration
results (Chernoff bound [14, Chapter 4]), we can easily show
that, P
[|L− µ| > ǫµ] ≤ exp (−Ω(nǫ2µN)). Using similar
argument for M we can also write P
[|M − µM | > ǫµM ] ≤
exp
(−Ω(ǫ2µMN)). Because both M and L concentrate
around their expected values exponentially fast in N , so does
the efficiency E.
B. Proof of Lemma 4
We concentrate on Alice (the other terminals perform fewer
operations). In step 3 of the initial phase, Alice creates up to
N y-packets, using the construction specified in lemma 5; this
requires up to N3 operations. In step 1 of the reconciliation
phase, she creates up to N − L z-packets, using a network
coding construction [11]; this requires up to (N − L)N2
operations. In step 3 of the reconciliation phase, she creates L
s-packets, using the construction specified in Lemma 6; this
requires up to LN2 operations.
Thus, Alice performs at most 2N3 operations to create L =
δE(1−maxi δi)N secret packets. For δE and δi constant, Alice
performs O(N2) operations per secret packet. 
C. Coded Cooperative Data Exchange
Assume we have n nodes and a set of packets; each node
has a subset of the packets, and is interested in collecting the
ones she misses. We want to achieve this using the minimum
total number of transmissions from the nodes. We can solve
this problem in polynomial time [33], [34]; for completeness,
we provide in the following an Integer Linear Program (ILP)
that accepts an efficient polynomial-time solution [34].
We will use the following notation:
• L: a subset of the nodes; there exist 2n such subsets.
• Lc: set of all nodes not in L.
• Pci : set of all packets that node i does not have.
• Ki: total number of transmissions that source i makes.
min K1 +K2 + . . .+Kn
subject to∑
i∈L
Ki ≥ |
⋂
i∈Lc
Pci |, ∀L,
Ki ∈ Z+.
